“The American response during the enemy offensive was timely, forceful and decisive. This staunch resolve of the U.S. to stand behind its ally stunned the enemy.” LTG Ngo Quanq Truong, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 1972
“It is a fact that in the United States all the press, the media and intellectuals have a vested interest in our defeat.” Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, 1974
“. . . perhaps the major lesson of the Vietnam war is: do not rely on the United States as an ally.” Sir Robert Thompson, one of Britain’s leading experts on counterinsurgency, 1974.
Yesterday (October 18), George Stephanopoulos, in an interview with President Bush, asked if the current increase in violence in Iraq is comparable to the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. His question deserves an answer.
In the minds of many liberals, invoking Tet is the ultimate trump card to prove that the U.S. cannot, perhaps should not, win any war in the third world. In this, they are right that the lessons of Vietnam should be applied to Iraq. But, they are totally wrong in both fact and interpretation of what those lessons are.
The quotes above summarize the path of the Vietnam War and, regrettably, the path that we seem to be taking in Iraq.
In February 1968, North Vietnam violated the lunar New Year cease fire agreement and launched a massive attack throughout South Vietnam. Their goal was to spark a local uprising to overthrow the South Vietnamese government. In spite of some brief territorial gains, most notably in Saigon and Hue, the attack was a total failure. The local uprising in support of the North did not occur, the communist infrastructure established in the South was eliminated, and at the end of the battles, the casualties suffered by the North Vietnamese were more than 100 percent of the original attacking forces.
More importantly, Tet was such a major setback to North Vietnam’s ability to wage war in the South, that it would take another four years before the North could restore the capability to do so. By the end of 1971, 95 percent of the population of the South supported their government, agricultural production was at historically high levels, the communists were confined to small enclaves in the jungle, and one could travel almost anywhere in South Vietnam in security. I know. I was there.
By most accepted definitions, the war had been won and the peace was fairly nearly won.
But, Tet was portrayed as a defeat for the American effort by the media and that view was adopted by a large segment of our country. Indeed, it has entered the conventional wisdom as a symbol of the futility of exercising American power.
The political climate that emerged from such a biased view, led to precipitous withdraw of American forces based upon unilateral timetables that bore no relationship to what was actually happening in Vietnam. (Sound familiar?)
In 1968’s Tet battles, the US had 543,400 military personnel in South Vietnam. The politically imposed reductions lowered that number by more than 90 percent to 49,000 by early 1972. In spite of those reductions, a dramatic shift in the tactics used by the U.S. forces and acceleration in training and empowering the South Vietnamese military helped secure the peace after Tet.
The reductions in US force levels were accompanied by promises to the South Vietnamese that the US would continue to support their country with supplies and air support. That promise was to be tested in Easter 1972.
On March 30, 1972, North Vietnam launched a conventional invasion of the South which, in terms of manpower, was larger than the 1968 Tet Offensive. Every combat division and independent brigade in the North Vietnamese army was committed. The South Vietnamese army faced them standing alone on the ground; there were no American troops to help them. They were helped only by continued supplies and available American airpower. (As an aside, my tour in Vietnam ended just a month before this offensive began. I was intimately familiar with many of the areas of conflict and followed it in great detail—my friends were still there.)
The results were the same as in 1968. South Vietnam, without US troops at their side this time, massively defeated the North. The Republic of Vietnam had turned back the communist invasion and was still in control of its territory. America’s quest to help an ally obtain freedom was almost accomplished. And, our fidelity was appreciated, as seen by the first quote above.
But, this victory was not reported in America. To the extent it was covered at all, the reporting was critical of the South and, especially, of continued US support of a “doomed” cause.
Political pressure to withdraw the US at any cost continued to mount, forcing a peace accord in 1974 that all parties knew at the time was a sham; North Vietnam would not honor any commitments it had made. Knowing that future attacks were certain to occur, the US promised South Vietnam that it would continue to provide military aid and air support in the case of another invasion.
The Congress didn’t care, it only wanted out. Treaty commitments were ignored. Promised aid was not forthcoming. South Vietnamese military supplies were so limited that, in some units, bullets were issued to the soldiers one at a time. When the inevitable invasion occurred in 1975, the South was truly alone; the US reneged on every promise of support that it had made.
Even though the invading forces of 1975 were no more powerful than those of 1972, this time they won handily.
Who can forget the images of the final day of Saigon’s fall? The rooftops were covered with those who had believed that the American Dream of freedom could be theirs. Their arms were raised to the heavens, some holding children. Those arms were not raised in prayer to God, but in unanswered prayer to the fleeing US helicopters that they not be abandoned.
The South Vietnamese lost their struggle to be free, and the cost of their defeat was high. The armed forces lost 275,000 killed in action. Another 465,000 civilians lost their lives; many were assassinated by the Viet Cong and others fell to the indiscriminate shelling of cities by the North. More than two million were driven from their country. Of those who stayed, an estimated 315,000 were either executed outright or killed in the vicious “reeducation” camps set up by their “liberators”.
I fear that my country is traveling down the same ignominious path that it trod three decades ago. Once again, we are trying to help the people of a country to be free and in control of their own land. Once again, we have many influential voices who have staked their political future to an American failure. And again, they are using the same tactics that they used in Vietnam to twist the facts, distort the accomplishments, and ignore the implications for those we are trying to help.
If they succeed in their efforts to get America to withdraw from the struggle, the strategic implications for the Middle East and impact on the US will be dire. But, the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who have joined with the US to fight for freedom and democracy in their country won’t care. They will be dead; killed, like others before them, for putting their trust in a country that is not bound by its own promises.
The combat troops of Vietnam shared an attitude that is common with the troops of today in Iraq: the cause of freedom is a worthy one and the people we are trying to help deserve that help.
It’s a shame that too many of our political leaders don’t agree.
“It is a fact that in the United States all the press, the media and intellectuals have a vested interest in our defeat.” Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, 1974
“. . . perhaps the major lesson of the Vietnam war is: do not rely on the United States as an ally.” Sir Robert Thompson, one of Britain’s leading experts on counterinsurgency, 1974.
Yesterday (October 18), George Stephanopoulos, in an interview with President Bush, asked if the current increase in violence in Iraq is comparable to the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. His question deserves an answer.
In the minds of many liberals, invoking Tet is the ultimate trump card to prove that the U.S. cannot, perhaps should not, win any war in the third world. In this, they are right that the lessons of Vietnam should be applied to Iraq. But, they are totally wrong in both fact and interpretation of what those lessons are.
The quotes above summarize the path of the Vietnam War and, regrettably, the path that we seem to be taking in Iraq.
In February 1968, North Vietnam violated the lunar New Year cease fire agreement and launched a massive attack throughout South Vietnam. Their goal was to spark a local uprising to overthrow the South Vietnamese government. In spite of some brief territorial gains, most notably in Saigon and Hue, the attack was a total failure. The local uprising in support of the North did not occur, the communist infrastructure established in the South was eliminated, and at the end of the battles, the casualties suffered by the North Vietnamese were more than 100 percent of the original attacking forces.
More importantly, Tet was such a major setback to North Vietnam’s ability to wage war in the South, that it would take another four years before the North could restore the capability to do so. By the end of 1971, 95 percent of the population of the South supported their government, agricultural production was at historically high levels, the communists were confined to small enclaves in the jungle, and one could travel almost anywhere in South Vietnam in security. I know. I was there.
By most accepted definitions, the war had been won and the peace was fairly nearly won.
But, Tet was portrayed as a defeat for the American effort by the media and that view was adopted by a large segment of our country. Indeed, it has entered the conventional wisdom as a symbol of the futility of exercising American power.
The political climate that emerged from such a biased view, led to precipitous withdraw of American forces based upon unilateral timetables that bore no relationship to what was actually happening in Vietnam. (Sound familiar?)
In 1968’s Tet battles, the US had 543,400 military personnel in South Vietnam. The politically imposed reductions lowered that number by more than 90 percent to 49,000 by early 1972. In spite of those reductions, a dramatic shift in the tactics used by the U.S. forces and acceleration in training and empowering the South Vietnamese military helped secure the peace after Tet.
The reductions in US force levels were accompanied by promises to the South Vietnamese that the US would continue to support their country with supplies and air support. That promise was to be tested in Easter 1972.
On March 30, 1972, North Vietnam launched a conventional invasion of the South which, in terms of manpower, was larger than the 1968 Tet Offensive. Every combat division and independent brigade in the North Vietnamese army was committed. The South Vietnamese army faced them standing alone on the ground; there were no American troops to help them. They were helped only by continued supplies and available American airpower. (As an aside, my tour in Vietnam ended just a month before this offensive began. I was intimately familiar with many of the areas of conflict and followed it in great detail—my friends were still there.)
The results were the same as in 1968. South Vietnam, without US troops at their side this time, massively defeated the North. The Republic of Vietnam had turned back the communist invasion and was still in control of its territory. America’s quest to help an ally obtain freedom was almost accomplished. And, our fidelity was appreciated, as seen by the first quote above.
But, this victory was not reported in America. To the extent it was covered at all, the reporting was critical of the South and, especially, of continued US support of a “doomed” cause.
Political pressure to withdraw the US at any cost continued to mount, forcing a peace accord in 1974 that all parties knew at the time was a sham; North Vietnam would not honor any commitments it had made. Knowing that future attacks were certain to occur, the US promised South Vietnam that it would continue to provide military aid and air support in the case of another invasion.
The Congress didn’t care, it only wanted out. Treaty commitments were ignored. Promised aid was not forthcoming. South Vietnamese military supplies were so limited that, in some units, bullets were issued to the soldiers one at a time. When the inevitable invasion occurred in 1975, the South was truly alone; the US reneged on every promise of support that it had made.
Even though the invading forces of 1975 were no more powerful than those of 1972, this time they won handily.
Who can forget the images of the final day of Saigon’s fall? The rooftops were covered with those who had believed that the American Dream of freedom could be theirs. Their arms were raised to the heavens, some holding children. Those arms were not raised in prayer to God, but in unanswered prayer to the fleeing US helicopters that they not be abandoned.
The South Vietnamese lost their struggle to be free, and the cost of their defeat was high. The armed forces lost 275,000 killed in action. Another 465,000 civilians lost their lives; many were assassinated by the Viet Cong and others fell to the indiscriminate shelling of cities by the North. More than two million were driven from their country. Of those who stayed, an estimated 315,000 were either executed outright or killed in the vicious “reeducation” camps set up by their “liberators”.
I fear that my country is traveling down the same ignominious path that it trod three decades ago. Once again, we are trying to help the people of a country to be free and in control of their own land. Once again, we have many influential voices who have staked their political future to an American failure. And again, they are using the same tactics that they used in Vietnam to twist the facts, distort the accomplishments, and ignore the implications for those we are trying to help.
If they succeed in their efforts to get America to withdraw from the struggle, the strategic implications for the Middle East and impact on the US will be dire. But, the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who have joined with the US to fight for freedom and democracy in their country won’t care. They will be dead; killed, like others before them, for putting their trust in a country that is not bound by its own promises.
The combat troops of Vietnam shared an attitude that is common with the troops of today in Iraq: the cause of freedom is a worthy one and the people we are trying to help deserve that help.
It’s a shame that too many of our political leaders don’t agree.
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